By Dr. Carsten Sander Christensen
From Gorbachev’s opening of the Soviet system to today’s European dilemmas over Ukraine
Few political reforms of the twentieth century had consequences as far beyond their original purpose as Mikhail Gorbachev’s ‘glasnost’ and ‘perestroika’. Introduced in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s as an attempt to modernize socialism, they instead helped release forces that Moscow could no longer control. With Western Europe playing a fatal role. Censorship weakened, political discussion expanded, national grievances resurfaced and the authority of the Communist Party began to erode. The consequences were felt not only in Moscow, Riga, Kyiv, Tbilisi or Baku, but throughout all Europe. The revolutions of 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of fifteen independent states transformed the European political map. Yet more than three decades later, Europe continues to struggle with some of the questions unleashed during the Gorbachev era: Where does Europe end? What constitutes a nation? How should the continent relate to Russia? And how far is the European Union prepared to integrate countries whose histories were shaped by the Soviet experience?
Glasnost opened the door to national conflicts
Openness was intended to strengthen ‘perestroika’ by allowing citizens to discuss problems and expose inefficiencies. But once the Soviet leadership discovered that many of the problems were not merely economic. They were national. The policy of ‘glasnost’ significantly changed the information environment of the Soviet Union. Scholars have described the changing media environment as one of the most important mechanisms behind the political mobilization of the late Soviet period. (1) This was particularly important in the Caucasus region. Originally the Treaty of Turkmenchay was in force in Caucasus: Under Article XV of the treaty, concluded between Russia and the Qajars (Iran) in 1828, Armenians living in Iranian territory were granted the right to freely migrate to the lands of Northern Azerbaijan. Later, the failed mass resettlement policy of first the Tsar, later Stalin, and finally Soviet political leaders had serious consequences in the region. Furthermore, the Soviet Union also completely ignored Alexander Griboyedov’s proposals from the early 1800s.
Alexander Griboyedov oversaw the mass resettlement of Armenian families from the Tabriz, Khoy, Salmas, and Maragha regions, which were under the control of the Russian army. He recommended and planned the provinces of Iravan, Nakhchivan, and Karabakh—lands belonging to Azerbaijan—as the primary areas for their settlement. This planned migration drastically altered the region’s historical ethnic composition and laid the groundwork for the future realization of Armenian statehood interests in those territories.
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh erupted publicly in 1988, when Armenian representatives in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast demanded that the territory be transferred from Azerbaijan SSR to Armenia SSR. ‘Glasnost’ provided a new political environment in which grievances could be articulated openly, and mass mobilization became possible. (2) The resettled Armenians were primarily placed on the most fertile state-owned lands in the Iravan and Yelizavetpol (Ganja) governorates—areas where Azerbaijanis had lived for centuries—as well as in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the shores of Lake Goycha.
For Azerbaijan, this was a decisive moment in the development of modern national political identity. Mass demonstrations in Baku and elsewhere transformed the Karabakh question into a central national issue and contributed to the emergence of the Azerbaijani Popular Front. Research on Azerbaijani nation-building specifically identifies the Karabakh crisis and the Freedom Square movement as important moments in the formation of a new collective identity. (2) In this sense, ‘glasnost’ did not “cause” the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but was a main reason why the war lasted until today. The dispute helped turn a largely contained Soviet nationality problem into an openly contested political and national conflict. The weakening of central authority then made the situation still more dangerous. Nagorno-Karabakh became, in many respects, an early warning of what would happen when Soviet political control disappeared. And a reminder that glasnost and perestroika might never have been realized.
The identity vacuum after the Soviet collapse
The dissolution of the Soviet Union created fifteen independent states, but independence did not automatically produce a settled national identity. For decades, Soviet citizens had lived within a political framework that simultaneously promoted Soviet identity and managed ethnic distinctions. When that framework disappeared, newly independent states had to answer fundamental questions: Who are we? What is our history? Which language should define the state? Which historical memories should be celebrated? And, perhaps most importantly, what should our relationship with Russia be? The answer was different in every republic. In Azerbaijan, independence encouraged the rediscovery of national history, language and cultural traditions. In the Baltic states, national independence was connected to memories of pre-Soviet statehood. In Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, the relationship between Soviet heritage, national identity and European orientation proved more complicated. Nor did the problem disappear for Russian-speaking populations outside Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed millions of people from citizens of the dominant Soviet republic into minorities in newly independent states. Researchers have described the experience as a profound identity crisis for Russians living in the former Soviet republics. (3)
This legacy remains politically significant today. Post-Soviet states have spent decades constructing national identities that distinguish them from Russia, while Moscow has repeatedly promoted alternative ideas of a common Russian, Soviet or Eurasian historical space. The unresolved identity question is therefore not merely historical. It remains at the centre of the geopolitical struggle between Russia and its neighbours. Where neither side in the political discussion is right.
Ukraine and Europe’s unfinished integration
Ukraine represents perhaps the clearest example of this unfinished European transformation. Ukraine applied for EU membership in February 2022 and received candidate status later that year. Accession negotiations formally began in 2024, and the first negotiating cluster was opened in June 2026. (4) Yet European enthusiasm has its limits. Several major EU states have resisted proposals for an exceptionally rapid Ukrainian accession. Concerns include corruption, institutional reforms, the size of Ukraine’s agricultural sector and the financial implications of membership. In March 2026, Reuters reported that France and Germany were among the countries opposing a fast-track approach. (5) This reveals a fundamental contradiction in contemporary Europe. Politically, Ukraine is increasingly regarded as part of Europe. Economically and institutionally, however, integration is considerably more complicated. The EU can support Ukraine politically and militarily while simultaneously worrying about the consequences of full membership. Ukraine’s accession would change the balance of the Union—not least because of its enormous agricultural potential.
The Ukraine farmers’ question
Agriculture has become one of the most sensitive aspects of the European debate. Ukraine possesses some of the world’s most productive agricultural land and has traditionally been a major exporter of grain, sunflower products and other agricultural commodities. After Russia’s invasion in 2022, the EU temporarily liberalised trade rules to help the Ukrainian economy survive. The consequences were controversial. Ukrainian agricultural exports to the EU increased substantially, and farmers in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania complained that cheaper Ukrainian products were depressing local prices. (6) The political reaction was particularly strong in Central and Eastern Europe, where farmers organised blockades and demonstrations. Brussels subsequently introduced safeguards and emergency mechanisms for several agricultural products. (7) The issue illustrates the difficulty of European integration. Ukrainian agriculture may be highly competitive, but European farmers do not necessarily see that competitiveness as an advantage. Research on possible Ukrainian EU membership notes that European farmers fear competition because of Ukraine’s extensive farmland and relatively low production costs. (8) Thus, Europe’s reluctance is not simply geopolitical. It is also economic. A Europe that welcomes Ukraine politically must nevertheless persuade European farmers that Ukrainian membership will not threaten their livelihoods.
What if the Soviet Union had survived?
The most fascinating question is perhaps the counterfactual one: What would Europe look like if the Soviet Union had not collapsed? There is no certain answer. But one possibility is clear: Europe would probably be a much more divided continent. Without the collapse of the USSR, the Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics would not have becomesovereign states in 1991. The European Union’s eastern enlargement would have looked radically different. NATO’s expansion would almost certainly have faced a much more powerful geopolitical obstacle. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict might also have developed differently. A surviving Soviet centre could potentially have imposed a settlement through political or military force. Yet the underlying Armenian Azerbaijani dispute would not necessarily have disappeared. The Soviet system had suppressed many national conflicts; it hd not necessarily solved them. Indeed, the experience of the late 1980s suggests that the Soviet Union could perhaps have survived only through either much deeper federalization or renewed repression. That is the great paradox of Gorbachev. He wanted to save the Soviet Union by making it more open and efficient. Instead, ‘glasnost’ gave its peoples the language with which to question the Union itself. ‘Perestroika’ weakened the old economic and political mechanisms without creating stable replacements. The result was not a renewed Soviet state but its dissolution.
Europe’s unfinished Gorbachev legacy
Today, Europe still lives with the consequences. Ukraine’s difficult road towards the EU, the continuing sensitivity surrounding Russian influence, the unresolved legacy of Soviet nationalities and the political tensions surrounding Ukrainian agricultural exports are all, in different ways, connected to the transformation that began under Gorbachev. The tragedy is that the openness he introduced revealed problems that could no longer be hidden. The opportunity was that it allowed nations previously confined within the Soviet system to rediscover their political voices. For Azerbaijan, the legacy is especially profound. The Karabakh conflict demonstrated how quickly suppressed national questions could become existential political struggles once censorship and central authority weakened. For Ukraine, the post-Soviet experience has become a long struggle to define a sovereign European identity. And for the European Union, the challenge is now to determine whether political solidarity can ultimately be transformed into genuine institutional integration. Gorbachev opened the Soviet window. Europe has spent the decades since 1991 trying to decide what should come through it—and where Europe’s eastern frontier should finally be drawn. (9)
(1): https://wwws.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/intn.html?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Internal Workings of the Soviet Union – Revelations from the Russian Archives | Exhibitions – Library of Congress”
(2): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/nationalities-papers/article/citizenship-national-identity-and-nationbuilding-in-azerbaijan-between-the-legacy-of-the-past-and-the-spirit-of-independence/B42D38E5F6DA18CDD6FF2A030A851B0D?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Citizenship, National Identity, and Nation-Building in Azerbaijan: Between the Legacy of the Past and the Spirit of Independence | Nationalities Papers | Cambridge Core”
(3): https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.1996.9993927?utm_source=chatgpt.com “The new Russian diaspora ‐ an identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet republic: Ethnic and Racial Studies: Vol 19, No 3”
(4): https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/countries/ukraine_en?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Ukraine – Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood – European Commission”
(5): https://www.reuters.com/world/european-capitals-push-back-ukraine-seeks-fast-track-eu-membership-2026-03-03/?utm_source=chatgpt.com “European capitals push back as Ukraine seeks fast-track EU membership”
(6): https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukrainian-agriculture-risk-european-unions-liberalized-trade-measures-expire?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Ukrainian Agriculture at Risk as the European Union’s Liberalized Trade Measures Expire”
(7): https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/emergency-brake-triggered-groats-imports-ukraine-2024-07-19_en?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Emergency brake triggered for groats imports from Ukraine – Agriculture and rural development”
(8): https://www.iddri.org/en/publications-and-events/scientific-publication/ukraines-accession-eu-implications-european?utm_source=chatgpt.com “Ukraine’s Accession to the EU: Implications for the European Agricultural Sector | IDDRI”
(9): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/contemporary-european-history/article/revolutions-of-1989-causes-meanings-consequences/5A1CAA38FE5BB1BDE3D618A70C9F006F?utm_source=chatgpt.com “The Revolutions of 1989: Causes, Meanings, Consequences | Contemporary European History | Cambridge Core”
