By İsmail Cingoz, International Politics Expert

Twenty-first-century wars no longer devastate only the countries fighting on the battlefield. The Russia–Ukraine War, the intensifying U.S.–Iran conflict in 2026, and geopolitical tensions stretching from the Black Sea to the Red Sea and from the Strait of Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb are affecting almost every artery of the global economy—from energy and food to transportation, inflation, interest rates and global growth.

In other words, the economic front of modern warfare extends across a geography far wider than the military battlefield itself. Today, the cost of an attack on a Ukrainian port is reflected in the price of bread in Africa; the cost of a tanker halted in the Strait of Hormuz reaches factories in Europe; and higher insurance premiums in the Red Sea are ultimately incorporated into the prices of consumer goods shipped from Asia.

Energy Is No Longer Merely an Economic Commodity, but a Strategic Weapon

The Russia–Ukraine War marked one of the most significant turning points in re-establishing energy security as a matter of national security within the international system. Europe’s efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian energy resources accelerated investments in liquefied natural gas (LNG), alternative pipelines and renewable energy, reshaping the routes of global energy trade.

However, the direct impact of the U.S.–Iran conflict on the Strait of Hormuz in 2026 has created a new and potentially far more extensive risk for global energy markets.

As of 11 September 2026, Brent crude oil was once again trading above USD 100 per barrel, while commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz had fallen far below pre-war levels. Reports that only seven commercial vessels passed through the strait on 10 September 2026 provide a striking indication of the vulnerability confronting global energy supplies.

Before the conflict, oil flows passing through this route were equivalent to approximately 20 percent of global petroleum liquids consumption, while more than 20 percent of global LNG trade also transited the Strait of Hormuz (Reuters, 2026; EIA, 2026).

The World Trade Organization’s 2026 projections further illustrate the scale of the threat. If oil and LNG prices remain elevated throughout the year, global economic growth could be approximately 0.3 percentage points lower, while growth in world merchandise trade could decline by an additional 0.5 percentage points. The losses could be significantly greater for economies that are heavily dependent on imported energy (WTO, 2026).

The Second Front of War: Inflation

Higher energy prices do not simply mean more expensive fuel. Oil and natural gas are fundamental inputs across virtually every stage of the economy, including industrial production, electricity generation, transportation, petrochemicals, agriculture and fertilizer manufacturing. Consequently, an energy shock is rapidly transmitted into production costs and, from there, into consumer prices.

In its July 2026 assessment, the International Monetary Fund projected global economic growth at around 3 percent for 2026, while raising its forecast for global headline inflation to 4.7 percent and noting that the disinflationary trend underway since 2024 had stalled (IMF, 2026).

This situation also places central banks in a difficult dilemma. Keeping interest rates high in order to contain inflation suppresses economic growth, investment and consumption. Yet lowering interest rates increases the risk that energy- and food-driven inflation will become more persistent.

The World Bank has likewise stated that the conflict in the Middle East is expected to push global growth toward its lowest rate since the COVID-19 period through the combined effects of higher energy prices, rising inflation and increased borrowing costs (World Bank, 2026).

Data from UNCTAD—the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—also demonstrate that nominal growth in global trade figures may be misleading. Although the value of world merchandise trade reached approximately USD 13.7 trillion in the first half of 2026, a substantial part of this increase resulted not from an expansion in production and trade volumes but from higher energy, transportation and logistics costs.

The prices of internationally traded goods are estimated to have increased by approximately 5 percent in the second quarter of the year (UNCTAD, 2026).

The Food Security Chain Extending from the Black Sea to Hormuz

One of the most dangerous consequences of wars for the global economy emerges in the field of food security. Ukraine and Russia have long been among the world’s principal actors in the trade of grains, oilseeds and fertilizers. For this reason, every disruption affecting Black Sea ports generates not merely a regional but a global price impact.

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), although Ukraine’s grain and oilseed production is expected to reach approximately 84.2 million tonnes in the 2026/27 season, effective storage capacity has remained at around 59 million tonnes because of war-damaged infrastructure and disruptions to Black Sea exports. The storage deficit is projected to reach 11 million tonnes by November 2026 (FAO, 2026a).

The problem, however, is no longer limited to Ukraine. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz are also increasing global agricultural production costs by driving up energy and fertilizer prices.

FAO has warned that the conflict in the Middle East poses serious food security risks, particularly for import-dependent countries in Africa and Asia, through its effects on energy, fertilizers and agricultural-input trade (FAO, 2026b).

In August 2026, the FAO Food Price Index rose to 133.3 points. Global wheat prices increased by 2.6 percent in just one month and stood 15 percent higher than a year earlier. FAO identified difficulties affecting Black Sea exports, the Middle East conflict, and pressures in energy and fertilizer markets among the principal risks behind the increase (FAO, 2026b, 2026c).

For this reason, it is becoming increasingly impossible to assess energy security and food security independently of one another. When oil prices rise, it is not only the cost of filling a car’s fuel tank that increases; so do the costs of fertilizer in the field, tractors, transportation and, ultimately, the bread on the table.

Geopolitical Conflicts Are Redrawing the Global Trade Map

Security crises in the Black Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea are forcing companies to use routes that are longer and more expensive but considered safer. Rising freight rates, war-risk insurance premiums, port delays and the costs of alternative routes are ultimately transferred to consumers.

Consequently, the principle of the “cheapest route,” once central to globalization, is increasingly being replaced by the principle of the “safest route.”

This transformation is also increasing the strategic importance of alternative energy and transport corridors connecting the Caspian Basin, the South Caucasus and Türkiye with Europe.

At this point, Azerbaijan acquires particular significance.

According to European Commission data, Azerbaijan’s natural gas supplies to European Union countries reached 12.5 billion cubic metres in 2025, representing an increase of 53.8 percent compared with 2021. During the first six months of 2026, Azerbaijan exported a total of 12.7 billion cubic metres of natural gas, of which 5.9 billion cubic metres were supplied to European markets (European Commission, 2026; Ministry of Energy of Azerbaijan, 2026).

This picture positions Azerbaijan not merely as an energy producer but increasingly as a strategic country that contributes to security of supply and diversification of routes within an ever more fragile global system.

Conclusion: The Cost of War Is Now Being Paid by the Entire World

The Russia–Ukraine War, the U.S.–Iran conflict and the intensifying geopolitical struggle surrounding strategic maritime chokepoints once again demonstrate the extent to which the global economy has become interdependent.

An energy crisis fuels inflation; inflation shapes interest-rate policy; high interest rates constrain growth; and expensive energy increases agricultural and food prices. The heaviest burden ultimately falls on developing countries that are highly dependent on energy and food imports and already carry substantial debt burdens.

For this reason, victory or defeat in contemporary wars can no longer be measured solely on the battlefield.

If a war reduces economic growth thousands of kilometres away, erodes the purchasing power of millions of people and threatens global food security, then its economic boundaries are far wider than its geographical frontiers.

In today’s wars, bombs may fall on specific geographies, but the economic shock waves strike the entire world.

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References

European Commission. (2026, March 3). Press statement of Dan Jørgensen, European Commissioner for Energy and Housing and Parviz Shahbazov, Minister of Energy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/press-statement-dan-jorgensen-european-commissioner-energy-and-housing-and-parviz-shahbazov-minister-2026-03-03_en (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO]. (2026a, August 31). FAO, WFP, Mercy Corps and the Ukrainian Red Cross step up grain storage support to protect Ukraine’s 2026 harvest. https://www.fao.org/europe/news/detail/fao–wfp–mercy-corps-and-the-ukrainian-red-cross-step-up-grain-storage-support-to-protect-ukraine%27s-2026-harvest/en (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO]. (2026b). Global agrifood implications of the 2026 conflict in the Middle East: Impacts on energy and fertilizer trade, and food security. https://www.fao.org/agrifood-economics/publications/detail/en/c/1758065/ (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO]. (2026c, September 4). Supply concerns drive FAO Food Price Index higher in August. https://www.fao.org/geneva/news/details/supply-concerns-drive-fao-food-price-index-higher-in-august/en (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

International Monetary Fund [IMF]. (2026, July 8). Press briefing transcript: World Economic Outlook Update, July 8, 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/07/08/tr070826-weo-press-briefing-transcript-july-8-2026 (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Azerbaijan. (2026, July 17). In 6 months of this year, 13.3 million tons of oil and 25.4 billion cubic meters of natural gas were produced. https://minenergy.gov.az/en/xeberler-arxivi/00855 (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

Reuters. (2026, September 11). Hormuz shipping traffic falls to single digits, data shows. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hormuz-shipping-traffic-falls-single-digits-data-shows-2026-09-11/ (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD]. (2026, July 21). Global Trade Update, July/August 2026: Global trade continues to expand amid rising price pressures. https://unctad.org/publication/global-trade-update-julyaugust-2026-global-trade-continues-expand-amid-rising-price (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

U.S. Energy Information Administration [EIA]. (2026, March 3). World Oil Transit Chokepoints. https://www.eia.gov/international/content/analysis/special_topics/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/ (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

World Bank. (2026, June 11). Middle East conflict sends global growth to lowest rate since COVID-19. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/06/11/global-economic-prospects-june-2026-press-release (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

World Trade Organization [WTO]. (2026, March 19). Middle East conflict weighs further on slowing trade outlook.https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/stat_19mar26_329_e.htm (Accessed: September 11, 2026).

About the Author

İsmail Cingöz is an International Politics Expert and a PhD Candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Cappadocia University. He serves as the Ankara Representative of BULTÜRK and President of the TDPB Press Club. His academic interests include international security, geopolitics, defence industry studies, Turkish foreign policy, the Turkic World, and the transformation of the contemporary international system. E-mail: cingozismail01@gmail.com